University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1910

Liability of an Agent to Third Persons in Tort
Floyd R. Mechem

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Floyd R. Mechem, "Liability of an Agent to Third Persons in Tort," 20 Yale Law Journal 239 (1910).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

YALE
LAW JOURNAL
Vol. XX

FEBRUARY, 1911

No. 4

THE LIABILITY OF AN AGENT TO THIRD
PERSONS IN TORT
By Floyd R. Mechem, University of Chicago.
§ . IN GENERAL.-The question of the liability of the agent
to third persons in tort cases involves very different considerations
from those which govern his liability upon contracts. In the contract case the question whether any contract at all shall be made
is one which the parties may determine for themselves, and if
they decide to make a contract, they may determine with whom it
shall be made. They have the power to determine in advance who
shall be the party to be bound by the contract, and may so shape
the contract as to impose its liabilities upon the party so selected.
In the case of the tort, the situation is ordinarily entirely different. The question of whether a tort shall be committed has not
been left to the determination of the injured party; he has had no
opportunity nor power to determine by whom the tort shall be
committed; the situation lacks every element of consent and is the
result of the unauthorized and unlawful breaking in of one person
upon the rights or security of another.
§ 2.

AGENCY USUALLY NO DEFENSE IN TORT

CASES.-It is

sometimes said that "in torts the relation of principal and agent
does not exist. They are all wrong-doers and the liability of each
and all does not cease until payment has been made or satisfaction rendered or something equivalent thereto." I While this
statement undoubtedly requires some qualification, it is, nevertheless, declaratory of a rfiore or less general principle, and it is, as
1 S.ee Berghoff v. McDonald, 87 Ind., 549; Carraherv. Allen, 112 Ia.,

x68, 83 N. W., 902.
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will be seen, in many cases true that the fact that the wrongdoer
purported to do the act as agent for another is entirely immaterial
so far as his own liability is concerned. That fact may make the
alleged principal liable also, but it will in many cases have no
tendency to exonerate the alleged agent.
§ 3. AGENT LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT ACTS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE
oF HIS AGENc.-Before taking up the more difficult questions,
certain simple cases may be disposed of, concerning which there
could not well be any difference of opinion. Thus, if an agent,
while doing an act which has some relation to his agency, but is
really beyond the scope -of it, wilfully or negligently injures a
third person, he would undoubtedly be personally liable to the person injured. In such a case, the reputed principal would not be
liable and the agent would be the real principal. Thus, for example, if a servant or agent, acting entirely outside the scope of
his employment, should take his master's horse and wagon and go
off upon a frolic of his own and in doing so should wilfully or
negligently so manage the horse and wagon as to cause injury to a
third person, the servant or agent would undoubtedly be personally liable.
§ 4. LIABILITY OF AGENT FOR TRESPASS.-It is in general true
that every person who does an act which invades or violates the
right of property or security of another, does so at the peril of
being able to furnish legal justification for his act, if he be called
upon legally to account for it. Such a justification cannot be
found either in the general or the specific command or direction
of one who had no legal right to command or direct that the act
be done. It is therefore the general rule that an agent who trespasses upon the person or property of another is liable to the
person so injured and the fact of his agency furnishes no excuse. 2
2 A surveyor is personally liable for a trespass committed by him,
though the act was done in behalf and under the direction of a highway
board by which he was employed. Mill v. Hawker, L. R., 10 Ex., 92. To
same effect, Smith v. Colby, 67 Me., i69.
An agent who fences in a portion of the highway is liable for an injury caused thereby, though he does it for and under the direction of his
principal, a railway company. Blue v. Briggs, 12 Ind. App., io5, 39 N. E.,

885.
An agent who commits an assault on a third person is personally
liable even though he did it in the principal's interest and for the protection of his property. New Ellerslie Fishing Club v. Stewart, 123 Ky., 8,

93 S. W., 598; Canfield v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 59 Mo. App., 354.
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§ 5. SAME SUBJECT-PRINCIPAL'S KNOWLEDGE OR DIRECTION
NO DEFENSE.-It does not relieve the agent that the wrong was

committed with the knowledge of the principal, or by his consent
or express direction,3 because no one can lawfully authorize or direct the commission of a wrong. A fortiori,it is no defense that
the agent in committing the wrong violated his instructions from
his principal.' Neither is it material that the agent derives no
personal advantage from the wrong done.5 The fact that the
agent acted in good faith, supposing the principal had a legal right
to have done what was done, is no defense. He who intermeddles
with property not his own must see to it that he is protected by
the authority of one who is himself, by ownership or otherwise,
clothed with the authority he attempts to confer.6
§ 6.

LIABILITY OF AGENT FOR CONVERSION.-In

accordance

with the principles of the preceding section, it is generally held
that an agent who, for his principal, takes, sells or otherwise disposes of, the goods or chattels of another, without legal justification, is personally liable even though he acted in good faith, sup.
An agent who, while acting for his principal, sues out an attachment
against the plaintiffs property without reasonable cause for believing tha,
the statements, upon which it was obtained, were true, may be held liablf
for the malicious prosecution. Carraherv. Allen, 112 Ia., 168, 83 N. W.,
902.

An agent who, without justification, though acting for his prtncipai,
caused a distress for rent to be made, is personally liable. Bennett v.
Bayes, 5 H. & N., 391.
See also, Hazen v. Wight, 87 Me., 233, 32 AtI., 887; Welsh v. Stewart
31 Mo. App., 376; Horner v. Lawrence, 37 N. J. L., 46; Baker v. Davis
127 Ga., 649, 57 S. E., 62; Burns v. Horkan, 126 Ga., i6i, 54 S. E., 946.
8 Weber v. Weber, 47 Mich., 569, ii N. W., 389; Lee v. Mathews, io
Ala., 682, 44 Am. Dec., 498; Baker v. Wasson, 53 Tex., 157; Johnson v. Bar
ber, 5 Gil. (Ill.), 425, so Am. Dec., 416.

4 Starkweather

v. Benjamin, 32 Mich., 3o6; Johnson v. Barber,supra.

1Weber v.Weber, supra.
a Spraights v. Hawley, 39 N. Y., 44I, ioo Am. Dec., 452; Kimball v
Billings, 55 Me., 147, 92 Am. Dec., 581; Everett v. Coffin, 6 Wend. (N. Y.).
6o9, 22 Am. Dec., 551; Williams v. Merle, II Wend. (N. Y.), 8o, 25 Am
Dec., 6o4.
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posing the goods to be his principal's 7 and although he may have
delivered the goods taken to his principal.'
7 Lee v. Matthews, io Ala., 682, 44 Am.Dec., 498; Perminter v. Kelly,
18 Ala., 716, 54 Am. Dec., 177; Merchants & Planters' Bank v. Meyer, 56
Ark., 499, 20 S. W., 406; Swim v. Wilson, go Cal., 126, 27 Pac., 33, 25
Am. St. R., Io,13 L. R. A., 6o5; gerghoff v. McDonald, 87 Ind., 549;
Warder, etc., Co. v. Harris,81 Iowa, 153, 46 N. W., 859; Kimball v. Billings, 55 Me., 147, 92 Am. Dec., 581; McPheters v. Page, 83 Me., 234, 22
At]., io, 23 Am. St. Rep., 772; Wing v. Milliken, 91 Me., 387, 40 Atl., 138;
Milliken v. Hathaway, 148 Mass., 69, ig N. E., x6, i L. R. A., 5io; Coles
v. Clark, 3 Cush. (Mass.), 399; McPartlandv. Read, ixAllen (Mass.), 23!;
Edgerly v. Whalan, io6 Mass., 307; Robinson v. Bird, 158 Mass., 357, 33
N. E., 391, 35 Am. St., 495; XKearney v. Clutton, Io'Mich., io6, 59 N. W.,
419, 45 Am. St, 394; Koch v. Branch, 44 Mo., 542; Arkansas City Bank v.
Cassidy, 71 Mo. App., x86; Mohr v. Langan, 162 Mo., 474, 63 S. V., 40p.;
Gage v. Whittier, 17 N. H., 312; Spraights v. Hawley, 39 N. Y., 441, xoo
Am. Dec., 452; Thorp s. Burling, ii Johns. (N. Y.), 285; FarrarS. Chauffetete, 5 Den. (N. Y.), 527; Everett v. Coffin, 6 Wend. (N. Y.), 6o3, 22
Am. Dec., 551; Spencer v. Blackman, 9 Wend. (N. Y.), 167; Williams v.
Merle, ii Wend. (N. Y.), 8o, 25 Am. Dec., 604; Fowler v. Hollins, L. R. 7,
Q. B., 616; Perkins v. Smith, I Wils., 328; Stephens v. Elwall, 4 Maule &
Sel. 259; McCombie v. Davies, 6 East, 538; Baldwin v. Cole, 6 Mod., 212;
Pierson v. Graham, 33 Eng. C. L., 468.
Contra: See Frizzell v. Rundle, 88 Tenn., 396, 12 S. V., 918, 17 Am.
St., 9o8; Roach v. Turk, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.), 708, 24 Am. Rep., 360.
The Minnesota court has also, in Lenthold v.Fqirchild, 35 Minn., 99,
27 N. W., 503, 28 ideM. 218, laid down doctrines which cannot be reconciled with the preceding cases. See this case distinguished in Dolliff v.
Robbins, 83 Minn., 498, 86 N. W., 772, 85 Am. St., 466.
See also McLennan v. Leman, 57 Minn., 317, 59 N. W., 628.
8 Miller v. Wilson, 98 Ga., 567, 25 S.E., 578, s8 Am. St., 319; Edgerly
v. Whalan, ro6 Mass., 307; Lee v. Mathews, ioAla., 682, 44 Am. Dec., 498;
Kimball v. Billings. 55 Me., 147, 92 Am. Dec., 58t; Spraights v. Hawley,

39 N. Y., 441, Ioo Am. Dec., 452; Thorp v. Burling, ii Johns. (N. Y.), 285;
Williams s'. Merle. ii Wend. (N. Y.), 80, 25 Am. Dec., 604; Perkins v.

Sin ith, I Wils., 328; Stephens v. Elcall, 4 Maule & Sel., 259.
A sewing machine agent who takes from a married woman a machine
and some money, both belonging to her husband, in exchange for a new
machine, and turns over the old machine to his company, is guilty of conversion of the machine, and is liable to the husband in damages. No demand for the return of the old machine is necessary. Rice v. Yocnn, 155
Pa.. 538, 26 Atl., 698.
The essence of the conversion lies in the fact that the agent has done
or participated in doing some act which denies, repudiates, or destroys the
true owner's title and right to possession, as where he sells, delivers or
otherwise disposes of the property in such a way as to cut off or impede
the owner's right: Swim v. Wilson. 90 Cal., 126, 27 Pac., 33, 25 Am. St. R..
110, 13 L. R. A., 605; Porter v. Thomas. 23 Ga., 467; Cassidy Bros. v.
Elk Grove Cattle Co., 58 1I. App., 39: Fort v. Wclls. 14 Ind. App..
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Where the conversion charged against the agent consists of the
fact that he has refused to surrender, upon demand by one who is
really the rightful owner and entitled to possession, goods which
were delivered to him by his principal to be held for the latter,
somewhat different considerations apply. A mere refusal to surrender is not necessarily a conversion; it may be open to explanation. "Thus," it is said in one case,0 "it is no conversion for the
bailee of a chattel, who has received it in good faith from some
person other than the ovner, to refuse to deliver it to the owner
making demand for it until he has had time to satisfy himself in
regard to the ownership.10 In the case of a servant who has re531, 43 N. E., 155; Shearer v. Evans, 89 Ind., 4oo; Kearney v. Clutton, ioz Mich., io6, 59 N. W., 419, 45 Am. St. R., 394; Lafayette
Co. Bk. v. Metcalf, 40 Mo. App., 494; Stevenson v. Valentine, 27 Neb.,
338, 43 N. W., io7; Bercich v. Marye, 9 Nev., 312; Hoffman v. Carow,
20 Wend. (N. Y.), 21; Iredale z,. Kendall, 40 L. T. N. S., 362.;
London, 17 Q. B. Div., 705; Consolidated Co. v. Curtis (1892), i Q. B. Div.,
495; Barker v. Furlong [1891], 2.Ch. Div., x72; Perkins v. Smith, i Wils.,
328; Pearson v. Graham, 6 Ad. & El., 899; Ewhank v. Nutting, 7 C. B.,
797; Ganly v. Ledwidge, io Irish Rep. C. L., 33; Cranch v. White, i Bing.
N. C., 414, 6 Car. & Payne, 767.
But this rule is held not to apply where an agent in good faith and
without negligence takes by delivery negotiable instruments and transfers
them again by delivery, paying the proceeds to his principal and deriving
no profit himself. Spooner v. Holmes, io2 Mass., 503, 3 Am. Rep., 491.
So one who receives from his principal the property of another and
afterward returns it to his principal is not guilty of a conversion, even
though he may have reason to believe that the principal is not the owner:
Loring v. Mulcahy, 3 Allen (Mass.), 575; Wando Phosphate Co. v. Parker,
93 Ga., 414, 21 S. E., 53; National Merc. Bk. v. Ryrnill, 44 L. T. N. S., 767.
,So it is not ordinarily a conversion, where what the agent has done
amounts to simply changing the location of the property, but not in any
way denying or interfering with the owner's title. Burditt v. Hunt, 25
Me:, 419, 43 Am. Dec., 289; Metcalf v. McLaughlin, 122 Mass., 84; Gurley
v. Arinstead, 148 Mass., 267, ig N. E., 389, 2 L. R. A., 8o; Archibeque v.
Miera, i N. M., 419.
However, where the agent takes goods from the plaintiff and delivers
them to a third person under circumstances indicating a denial of the
owner's right, the agent may be held liable for the.conversion. Head v.
Jack, 12 Daly (N. Y.), 65.
OSinger Mfg. Co. v. King, i4 R. 1., 511.
10 Citing: Carrollv. Mix, 5i Barb. (N. Y.), 212; Lee v. Bayes, 18 C. B.,
599, 607; Sheridan v. The New Quay Co., 4 C. B. N. S., 618; Cales v.
Wright, 4 Taunt., x98.
To same effect see Go6dwin v. Wertheimer, 99 N. Y., 149, T N. E.,
404; Mount v. Derick, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 455; Arthur 7. Balch, 3 Fost. (N.
H.), i57.
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ceived the chattel from his master, it has been held that he ought
not to give it up without first consulting the master in regard to
it."' But if, after having had an opportunity to confer with his
master, he relies on his master's title and absolutely refuses to
comply with the demand, he will be liable for a conversion.12 The
mere fact that he refuses for the benefit of his principal will not
protect him." 13
§ 7. AGENT'S LIABILITY FOR FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION OR
DECEIT.-No one can give to another any lawful authority to
practice wilful fraud, misrepresentation or deceit upon a third.

An agent, therefore, who intentionally defrauds a third person or
injures him by wilful misrepresentation or deceit, is personally
liable for the injury he inflicts. 1 4 The principal may or may not

be liable also according as he may or may not be deemed to have
authorized or approved the wrongful acts. Where, however, the
agent acted in good faith and the fraud or deceit was the principal'sact alone, the agent would not be liable.1 5
In accordance with these principles an agent who fraudulently
induces a person to take out an insurance policy is liable to an
action for the injury sustained ;16 in such a case the party deceived
11 Citing: Mires v. Solebay, 2 Mod., 242, 245; Alexander v. Southey,
5 B. & A., 247; Berry v. Vantries, 12 Serg. & R., 89.
12 Citing Lee v. Robinson, 25 L. J. C. P., 249, 18 C. B., 599; I Addison
on Torts, §475; Greenway -v.Fisher, I Car. & P., i9o; Stephens v. Elwall,
4 M. & S., 259; Perkins v. Smith, I Wils., 328; Gage v. Whittier, 7 N. H.,
312. To same effect: Elmore v. Brooks, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.), 45.
13 Citing: Kimball v. Billings, 55 Me., 147.
14 Hantlin z'. Abell, 120 Mo., i88, 25 S. W., 516; Reed v. Peterson, 91
Ill., 288; Endsley v. Johns, 120 Ill., 469, 6o Am. Rep., 572; Moore v. Shields,
121 Ind., 267, 23 N. E., 89; Salisbury v. Iddings, 29 Neb., 736, 46 N. V.,
267; Weber z,. Weber, 47 Mich., 569, II N. W., 389; Starkweather v. Benjamin, 32 Mich., 3o6; Alpha Mills v. Watertown Steam Engine Co., 216
N. C., 797, 21 S. E., 917; Norris v. Kipp, 74 Ia., 444, 38 N. W., 152; Eaglesfield v,. Londonderry, L. R. 4 Ch. Div., 693.
15 Thus in Cullen v. Thomson, 4 Mac Q.. 424. 439. it is said by Lord
Wensleydale: "In some cases a man may innocently assist in a transaction
which is a fraud on some one. Of course, such a person cannot be responsible criminally or civilly. Or he may be a partaker in the fraud to a limited extent, as, for instance, in the supposed case adverted to in the course of
the argument, the printer of the alleged false statement, who may know it
to be false, and yet may not have intended or known sufficiently the fraudulent purpose to which it was meant to be applied, to make him responsihle
for the injurious consequences of it."
I r Hedden v'. Griffin, 136 Mass.. 229, 49 Am. Rep.. 25.
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has two remedies; he may retain the policy and sue for damages, or he may rescind the contract and recover from the agent
the premium paid. So an insurance agent who misrepresents material facts to the insured by reason of which the insured loses
his claim against the company for a loss sustained, is personally
responsible to the insured for the amount.27 An agent 'is responsible individually to the purchaser for a fraud committed by
him in the sale of property, though he does not profess to sell the
property as his own, but acts throughout in his capacity as an
18
agent.
As pointed out in the preceding sections, it is entirely immaterial that the agent derived no personal benefit from the wrong
done.19
§ 8. AGENT'S LIABILITY FOR His WILFUL OR M'IALICIOUS ACTS.
-An agent or servant is undoubtedly liable for his own wilful or
malicious acts. Under rules formerly prevailing and not yet entirely inoperative, holding the principal or master not liable in
such a case, there would be no one liable if the agent or servant
could not be held. The master or principal is now held liable in
many cases of this sort,20 but this additional liability of the principal does not destroy the liability of the agent.2 '

§ 9. AGENT LIABLE TO THIRD PERSONS FOR NEGLIGENT INHIm WHILE ACTING IN PERFORMANCE OF
AGENCY.-SO if an agent or servant, while acting upon his masJURIES COMMITTED BY

ter's business, so negligently acts as to inflict direct and immediate injury to the person or property of a third person, whether
he be one to whom the master owes a special duty or not, under
circumstances which would impose liability on the defendant, if
he were acting under the same conditions on his own account, he
17 Kroeger v. Pitcairn,ioz Penn. St., 311, 47 Am. Rep., 718.
18 Campbell v. Hillman, I5 B. Mon. (Ky.), 5o8, 61 Am. Dec., 19S.
19 Weber v. Weber, 47 Mich., 569, i N. W., 389.
20 See article by present writer in 9 Michigan Law Review, 87, i8i.
21 Horner v. Lawrence, 37 N. J. L., 46; Able v. Southern Ry. Co., 73
S. C., 173, 52 S. E., 962; Schumpert v. Southern Ry., 65 S. C., 332, 43
S. E., 813; Gardner v. Southern Ry. Co. & Pierson, 65 S. C., 341, 43 S. E.,
816; Holmes v. Wakefield et al., 94 Mass. (12 Allen), 58o; Hewett v.

Swift. 85 Mass. (3 Allen), 420.

Many of these were cases in which the question was whether the
master and servant could be joined in the same action, but they all
concede the liability of the agent.
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will be personally liable.2 2 Thus, if a servant while running upon
his master's errand should negligently knock down a by-stander,
under circumstances which would make the servant liable if he
were running upon his own errand, he would be personally liable.
And so if a servant while driving his master's horse, operating
his master's machine, or managing or conducting any other property of his principal over which he has control, so drives or manages as to inflict injury upon third persons under circumstances
which would render him liable if he were doing the same thing
on his own account, he will be personally liable. In such a case
the servant or agent is the actor, and the fact that he is acting
for a principal is only the occasion or the opportunity for his act,
but not its justification. The principal or master might also be
liable in such a case, but that would not excuse or exonerate the
23
agent.
It is also immaterial that the servant or agent violates a duty
he owes to his principal or master at the same time. Thus the
servant who, while driving his master's team, negligently crushes
the wagon of a third person, is liable to the latter, though he may
by the same negligent act crush his master's wagon and be liable to
him also.
22

Huinphreys Co. v. Frank, 46 Colo., 524, io5 Pac., xo93; Miller v.
Staples, 3 Colo. App., 93, 32 Pac., 8i; Phelps v. Wait, 30 N. Y., 78; Hewett
v. Swift, 3 Allen (85 Mass.), 42o.
Thus the director of a corporation may be held personally liable for
an assault which he orders (Peck v. Cooper, 112 Ill., 192, 54 Am. Rep.,
231) or in which he participates (Brokaw v. Railroad Co., 32 N. J. L.,
328). So of a malicious prosecution: Hussey v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co.,
98 N. Car., 34. So directors have been held personally liable for their
negligent (Cameron v. Kenyon Co.; 22 Mont., 312, 56 Pac., 358, 74 Am. St.
R., 6o2, 44 L. R. A., 5o8) or wilful conduct in the management of the corporation; Nunnelly v. Iron Co., 94 Tenn., 397, 29 S. W., 361, 28 L. R. A.,
421; and for the infringement of patents. National Cash Register Co. v.
Leland, 94 Fed., 5o2. The president of an incorporated club may be held
personally liable for the negligent discharge of fireworks under his direction. Jenne v. Sutton, 43 N. J. L., 257.
23 Eaglesfield v. Londonderry, 4 Ch. Div., 693 (per Jessel, M. R.);
Breen v. Field, 157 Mass., 277, 31 N. E., io75.
It is true that Blackstone declares that "if a smith's servant lames a
horse while he is shoeing him, an action lies against the master, but not
against the servant." But, as has often been pointed out, this was probably not true even in Blackstone's time, and is certainly not true to-day.
The case of Bfirch v. Caden Stone Co., 93 Fed., 18i, is apparently contrary to the rule of the text.
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§ IO.--The liability of the agent in these cases is not affected by
the fact that there is no privity of contract between himself and
the person injured. His liability does not depend upon privity,
but upon the general duty imposed on every one to so govern his
conduct as not to negligently injure another. Many illustrations
may be found in the reported cases. A railway engineer who negligently runs his master's engine at a high rate of speed through a
populous district would be liable if it were his own engine or
if it were an engine which he had hired or borrowed for the
occasion, and the case should not be different where it is. an
engine under his control, because he is in the service of a railroad
company. 24 If the running at that rate in that place was the result of the specific command of the company, a somewhat different
case would be presented, although even then he would not be justified in obeying specific commands in the face of obvious danger.
So a bricklayer who negligently drops a brick upon a passer-by
should be personally liable. It is his own act of negligence, in a
case in which he owes a duty of care, and the fact that he did it
while working for a master does not excuse him. 25
For similar reasons, an engineer of a switch engine and a
switchman are personally liable for negligently running down
another servant of the same company in disregard of signals
given them by the person injured ;28 and servants of a house24

Southern Ry. Co. v. Griczle, 124 Ga., 735, 53 S. E., 244; Southern Ry.

Co. v. Reynolds, 126 Ga., 657, 55 S. E., io39; Able v. Southern Ry. Co., 73.
S. C., 173, 52 S. E., 962; Ellis v. Southern Ry. Co., 72 S. C., 465, 52 S. E.,
228, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.), 378; Martin v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 95
Ky.; 612, 26 S. W., 8oi; Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Coley, 121 Ky., 385, 28
Ky. L. R., 336, 89 S. W., 234, i L. R. A. (N. S.), 370; Illinois Central
Ry. Co. v. Houchins, 121 Ky., 526, 28 Ky. L. R., 499, 89 S. W., 512, i L. R.

A. (N.
S.), 375.
25

Mayer v. Thompson-Hutchison Bldg. Co.,
L. R. A., 433, 53 Am. St., 88.
26

1o4

Ala., 611, x6 South.,

620, 28

Mayberry v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., ioo Minn., 79,

11o

N. W., 356.

Compare Bryce v. Southern Ry. Co., 125 Fed., 958.
In Colgate Co. v. Bross [Okla.], 1o7 Pac., 425, it was held that an
engineer operating an engine hoisting cars was liable to a fellow-servant
for injury caused by negligence in not obeying a signal given by another

fellow-servant.
In Galvin v. Brown & McCable, 53 Ore., 598, 1o1 Pac., 671, a general
superintendent of a corporation was held liable for negligently ordering

five timbers to be carried in a sling, instead of four, on account of
which one fell on plaintiff.

HeinOnline -- 20 Yale L.J. 247 1910-1911

YALE

LAW JOURNAL

mover are liable for their negligent acts in moving a house27
So where an agent, while acting for his principal, opened a
gap in another's fence and left it open, trusting to his own supervision to see that no injury was caused thereby, he was held personally liable for the loss of animals escaping through the opening. AGENT MUST HAVE BEEN AN ACTOR, NOT A MERE
§ ii.
AUTOMATON.-It would seem to be a necessary limitation upon
the liability of the agent in any case, that he can fairly be deemed
to have been an actor in the transaction rather than a mere automaton or mechanical instrumentality. Thus, in a case in which the
question was whether two agents, Baycs & Pcitngton, could
be held liable for directing a distress for rent to be made in behalf
of their principals, the landlords, by one Harrison, another agent,
it was said by Baron Bramwell in the Court of Exchequer :20 "It
occurred to my brother, Channell, and myself, who, together with
my brother Martin, heard this case, that it was doubtful whether,
under the circumstances, Bayes & Pcnnington could be liable for
the act of Harrison, whether in fact they were anything more
than a mere conduit-pipe for comnmunicating authority from the
landlords to Harrison. For my own part, and I believe I may say
for my brother Channell, if there had been nothing more, we
In Moyse v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (Mont.), xoS P-ac., io6z, defendants,
part of yard crew, were held liable for allowing cars to escape and collide
with the car in which plaintiff, a conductor, was riding.
27 Bickford v. Richards, 154 Mass., 163, 27 N. E., 10T4.
Lawrence, 37 N. J. L., 46.
2 Horner s,.
.29 Bennett ,.Bayes, 5 H. & N., 391.
In Brown v. Lent, 20 Vt., 529, it is said: "A mere intermediate agent
between the master and the direct agent cannot be held constructively responsible for the acts of the latter." Approved but distinguished in
Bilct v. Paisley. 18 Oreg., 47, 21 Pac.. 934, 4 L. R. A., 840.
So in Hewett v. Swift, 3 Allen (85 -Mass.), 42o, it was held that the
president of a corporation was not liable where, in his capacity as president
and as a "mere conduit for communication between the corporation and
the agent" who did the wrong, he transmitted to the latter the orders of
the corporation directing the doing of the act.
An intermediate agent like a steward or general manager is not personally liable for the acts of servants hired by him for his principal, and
whose act he neither directed, caused or participated in. Stone 'n Cartwright, 6 Term. Rep. (Durn. & E.), 4i; Bath v. Caton, 37 Mich., i99.
See also Nicholson v. Mounscy. i5 East, 384.
Agent not at fault. Within the same reasoning, the agent cannot be
held liable where he had no duty or power in the matter. Dudley v. llinois, etc.. Ry. Co., 127 Ky.. 221, 96 S. W., 835, 29 Ky. L. Rep., io29.
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should have continued to entertain great doubt whether they
would have been liable. It is certain that a messenger who delivers a letter containing a warrant of distress, not knowing the
contents of the letter, is not responsible; and I cannot help thinking that if a servant were sent with this message to a broker, 'My
master desires you to distrain for rent due to him,' the servant
would not be liable as a person ordering or committing the trespass. So, if a person wrote a letter in these terms, 'My friend,
having a bad hand, is unable to write, and he requests me to write
and tell you to distrain on his tenant,' it is difficult to say that a
person so writing would be liable to an action."
§ 12.

AGENT'S LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT

OMISSIONS.-MyS-

FEASANCE.-NONFEASANCE.-When

the question of the agent's
liability to third persons for negligent omissions to act is reached,
a problem of greater difficulty is presented. The doctrine very
early found expression in English law, that while a servant could
be personally charged for his active wrong-doing, the responsibility for his negligence rested on his master only. Thus Chief
Justice Holt in 17Ol declared that "a servant or deputy quatenus
such cannot be charged for neglect, but the principal only shall be
charged for it. But for a misfeasance an action will lie against a
servant or deputy, but not quatcnus a deputy or a servant, but as
a wrong-doer."30
More than a hundred years before, in an action involving the
liability of an under-sheriff, Coke, in arguing in the King's
Bench, had said: "I grant that an action for any falsity or deceit,
lyeth against the under-sheriff, as for embesseling, rasing of writs,
and so forth, but upon nonfeasans, as the case is here, the
not retorn of the summons, it ought to be brought against the
sheriff himself."31
And in a very much more recent case in Louisiana, the court
said:
"At common law, an agent is personally responsible to third
parties for doing something which he ought not to have done, but
not for not doing something which he ought to have done; the
agent in the latter case being liable to his principal only. For
non-feasance, or mere neglect in the performance of duty, the
responsibilty therefor must arise from some express or implied
,0 In Lane v. Cotton,

12

Mod.,

472,

488.

31 Marsh v. Astrey, I Leonard, 146.
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obligation between particular parties standing in privity of law
or contract with each other. No man is bound to answer for such
violation of duty or obligation except to those to whom he has
become directly bound or amenable for his conduct. * * * An
agent is not responsible to third persons for any negligence in the
performance of duties devolving upon him purely from his
agency, since he cannot, as agent, be subject to any obligations
toward third persons, other than those of his principal. Those
duties are not imposed upon him by law. He has agreed with
no one, except'his principal, to perform them. In failing to do so
he wrongs no one but his principal, who alone can hold him responsible." 32
§ 1-3 . SAME SUBJECT-CERTAIN RULES QUOTED.-Before attempting to work out any more definite principles certain rules
which have been widely quoted may well be noticed. Thus, in
one case,33 before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
Chief Justice Gray, later of the Supreme Court of the United
States, used the following language: "It is often said in the
books that an agent is responsible to third persons for misfeasance only, and not for non-feasance. And it is doubtless true
that if an agent never does anything towards carrying out his
contract with his principal, but wholly omits or neglects to do so,
the principal is the only person who can maintain any action
against him for the non-feasance.- But if the agent once actually
undertakes and enters upon the execution of a particular work,
it is his duty to use reasonable care in the manner of executing
32

Delaney z. Rochereau, 34 La. Ann., I23, 44 Am. Rep., 456.

So in Kahl v. Love, 37 N. J. L., 5, it is said: "It is not everyone who
suffers a loss from the negligence of another that can maintain a suit on
such a ground. The limit of the doctrine relating to actionable negligence
is, that the person occasioning the loss must owe a duty, arising from contract or otherwise, to the person sustaining such loss. Such a restriction
on the right to sue for a want of care in the exercise of employments or
the transaction of business, is plainly necessary to restrain the remedy
from being pushed to an impracticable extreme. There would be no
bounds to actions and litigious intricacies, if the ill effects of the negligence of men could he followed down the chain of results to the final
effect. Under such a doctrine, the careless manufacturer of iron might
be made responsible for the destruction of a steamer from the bursting of
a boiler, into which his imperfect material, after passing through many
hands and various transactions, had been converted. To avoid such absurd
consequences, the right of suit for such a cause has been circumscribea
within the bounds already defined."
33 Osborne v. Morgan, i3o Mass., 102, 39 Am. Rep., 437.
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it, so as not to cause any injury to third persons which may be
the natural consequence of his acts; and he cannot by abandoning
its execution midway, and leaving things in a dangerous condition, exempt himself from liability to any person who suffers injury by reason of his having so left them without proper safeguards. This is not non-feasance or doing nothing, but it is misfeasance, doing improperly."
In another case in the same court,3 4 in which an agent had been
charged with negligence in admitting water into the pipes of a
building without first seeing that they were in proper condition,
Judge Metcalf said: "Non-feasance is the omission of an act
which a person ought to do; misfeasance is the improper doing of
an act which a person might lawfully do; and malfeasance is the
doing of an act which a person ought not to do at all. The defendant's omission to examine the state of the pipes in the house
before causing the water to be let on was a non-feasance. But if
he had not caused the water to be let on, that no.n-feasance would
not have injured the plaintiff. If he had examined the pipes and
left them in a proper condition, and then caused the letting on of
the water, there would have been neither non-feasance nor misfeasance. As the facts are, the non-feasance caused the act done
to be a misfeasance. But from which did the plaintiff suffer?
Clearly from the act done, which was no less a misfeasance by
reason of its being preceded by a non-feasance."
So in the Louisiana case above referred to, it is said: "Every
one, whether he is principal or agent, is responsible directly to
persons injured by his own negligence, in fulfilling obligations
resting upon him in his individual character and which the law
imposes upon him independent of contract. No man increases or
diminishes his obligations to strangers by becoming an agent. If,
in the course of his agency, he comes in contact with the person or
property of a stranger, he is liable for any injury he may do to
either, by his negligence, in respect to duties imposed by law
upon him in common with all other men. * * * The whole doctrine on that subject culminates in the proposition that wherever
the agent's negligence, consisting in his own wrong doing, therefore in an act, directly injures a stranger, then such stranger can
recover from the agent damages for the injury." 35
Bell v. losselyn, 3 Gray (Mass.), 3o9, 63 Am. Dec., 741.
- Bermudez, C. J., in Delaney v. Rochereau. 34 La. Ann.. H23, 44
Am. Rep., 456.
34

HeinOnline -- 20 Yale L.J. 251 1910-1911

YALE LAW JOURNAL
§ 14. ATTE-MPTED DISTINCTION BETWEEN MISFEASANCE AND
NON-FEASANCE.-The attempted distinction between misfeasance

and non-feasance has been very much criticized and often denied
to exist. It is undoubtedly true that the Latin names employed
may not be very appropriate or illuminating. Notwithstanding
this, however, it is believed to be true that there is a real distinction lying back of these phrases which it is important to discover
and which is not more vague or indefinite than many other distinctions which it is necessary in our law to recognize.30
36 In the following cases acts- of alleged negligent omission have been
dealt with criminally:
R-ex v. Friend, Rus. & Ry., 20, where a master was held guilty of a
misdemeanor for not providing proper food and clothing for his apprentice, causing loss of health.
Regina v. Lowe, 3 C. & K., 123, where an engineer, employed to run
an engine to draw miners out of a coal pit, deserted his post and left an
ignorant boy in charge, and a miner was injured. The court held "that
a man may, by neglect of duty, render himself liable to be convicted of
manslaughter, or even murder."
But in Regina v. Smith, ii Cox C. C., 210, where the servant employed to watch at a crossing, there being no duty on the master to keep
a servant there, deserted his post, it was held that the servant was not
criminally liable because he owed no duty to the public.
Regina v. Nicholls, 13 Cox C. C., 75, where a grandmother, who was
compelled to leave home to work during the day, left an infant of tender
years in the care of her nine-year-old son, and the child died from want
of food. The court charged that there must be "wicked negligence" or
recklessness to make the defendant criminally liable.
In Regina v. Downes, 13 Cox C. C., iiI, a father from religious motives, neglected to furnish proper medical attention for his son. The court
said, "In this case there was a duty imposed by the statute on the prisoner
to provide medical aid for his infant child, and there was the deliberate
intention not to obey the law; whether proceeding from a good or bad
motive is not material."
Regina v. Instan (1893), I Q. B., 450, a niece was held criminally
liable for failing to provide food and medicine for an aunt, seventy-three
years old, with whom the niece lived. "The prisoner," said the court,
"was under a moral obligation to the deceased from which arose a legal
duty towards her."
In Rex v. Smith, 2 C. & P. 449, it was held that a brother was not
criminally liable for neglecting to provide food, warmth, etc., for an idiot
brother in his house. "There is strong proof that there was some negligince; but my point is, that omission, without a duty, will not create an
indictable offense."
For an elaborate discussion of The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a

Basis for Tort Liability, see articles by F. H. Bohlen, 56 Univ. of Pa. Law
Review, 217, 316.
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It is sometimes said that the only distinction, if one exists, is
to be found in the fact that in one case the agent has, while in the
other case he has not, actually entered upon the performance of
an undertaking which he has assumed for his principal. In the
latter case, it is said that if he had never entered upon the performance at all, as he had agreed to do, he is liable to his principal for not performing, but that he will not be liable to third persons, although they may have also suffered injury by reason of his
non-performance. In these cases, the agent's duty will often be
merely a contractual one and the third persons are not parties to
the contract. Even if it be a non-contractual one, it will usually
arise oat of some act, condition or relation which is personal to the
principal and the agent, and therefore will not sustain an action
by third persons, who are strangers to it.
§ I5.-This aspect.of the matter may be made somewhat clearer
by some further distinctions. In the case in hand, it may be, (i)
that the principal wa- under no obligations to the third person;
or (2) that the prihcipal had undertaken some duty to the third
person which he relied upon the agent to perform. The principal, for example, is party to an action involving a question in
which several others are equally but separately interested. The
principal has agreed with an attorney that the latter shall argue
his case. But the attorney wholly neglects to undertake it. It
is conceded that if he had argued it, he would probably have won
it. In any event, its determination would have settled the question
not only for his own client, but for all the others similarly interested and would have saved the latter' the expense and trouble of
settling it for themselves. The attorney is liable to his own client
for the loss he may have sustained, but no one would suggest that
he is liable to the other parties.
The principal is proprietor of a steamboat and has undertaken
to carry a company of people across a stream at a certain time.
He has engaged a captain to pilot the boat across. At the appointed
time the passengers are present, the captain is upon the ground,
everything is in readiness, but the captain utterly refuses to go
For the liability, under a statute, for not furnishing sufficient food to
a child whose care the defendant had undertaken, see Cowley v. People,
83 N. Y., 464, 38 Am. Rep., 464.
For not furnishing medical attendance where the parties believed in
"Christian Science," etc., see People v. Pierson, 176 N. Y., 2oi, 68 N. E.,
243, 98 Am. St. R., 666; Westrup v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky., 95, 93 S. W.,
46, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.), 685.
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upon the boat or in any respect to enter upon or perform his undertaking. The loss or inconvenience to the assembled passengers
may be very great. Can any one of them maintain an action
against the captain?
DISTINCTION.-It is said, however,
be liable if he never enters upon his
not
that while the agent may
entered upon the perfofrnance
actually
undertaking, yet if he has
persons who are injured by
third
to
of his duties he will be liable
care and diligence in
reasonable
reason of his failure to exercise
are possidistinctions
some
their performance. In this case also
a duty,
principal
his
ble. Suppose that though the agent owes
may
who
persons
third
to
yet the principal himself owes no duty
conprincipal
The
neglect.
sustain loss by reason of the agent's
the
is
it
which
fides to the charge of his agent certain premises
repair;
and
condition
agent's duty to his principal to keep in good
the agent fails to perform this duty, permits the premises to become dilapidated, and disreputable, and he is clearly liable to his
principal for the injury he sustains. But is the agent liable to the
adjoining proprietors because their premises are rendered less attractive or rentable or saleable or valuable by reason of the condition in which the agent has thus permitted his principal's premises
to be, that condition not constituting in law a nuisance? The
principal owes no duty to the adjoining proprietors and the agent
would owe them no duty if he were himself the principal.
§ I6.

FURTHER OF THIS

§ 17.-Suppose, next, that the principal is under some obligation
to the other party. A principal has contracted with a third person
to supply a horse fit for a lady to ride. He instructs his agent
to go into the market and buy a horse fit for a lady to ride, but
says nothing further to the agent respecting the use to which the
horse is to be put. The agent goes into the market and negligently buys a horse unfit for a lady to ride and delivers it to his
principal. The principal delivers the horse to the other party in
pursuance of the agreement, and the other party-a woman, let
us say-is injured while riding the horse as a result of its vicious
character. Is the agent liable to her? If the purchaser gives the
horse to her daughter, and the daughter is injured, is the agent
liable to the daughter? 36a
36a See Canmeron v. Mount, 86 Wis., 56, N. W., 1094, 22 L. R. A., 512,
where the defendant undertook to sell to plaintiff's husband a horse fit for
a woman to drive. At defendant's request, the wife drove the horse to try
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The principal is the proprietor of a steamboat, as in the case
already supposed in a previous illustration. The pilot, instead of
refusing to go at all, starts with the passengers for the desired
destination. After going part way, however, the pilot turns the
boat about, and sets the passengers all down again, safe but
angry, at the point from which they started. Is he now liable to
them?
The principal again is a carrier of passengers. He has undertaken to exercise at least reasonable care and dispatch to bring a
passenger to his destination at a particular time. The principal
entrusts the conduct of the vehicle to an agent, who knows the
facts. The agent so negligently manages the vehicle that the passenger does not arrive on time, and thereby sustains great loss.
May the passenger recover damages from the agent?
§ 18.-A client again, about to buy real estate, submits the abstract of title to his attorney for examination. The attorney examines the abstract and gives to his client a written opinion that
the title is good. As a matter of fact, the attorney has negligently
failed to observe a defect in the title. The client buys the land
and holds it without discovering the defect. He then offers to sell
the land to another and exhibits to him the opinion of the attorney concerning the title. The purchaser buys in reliance upon
the opinion without making further investigation. The client
conveys the land without warranty and never suffers in any way
from the defective title. The purchaser, however, does suffer
from it. In the absence at least of anything to indicate that the
attorney had reason to believe that his opinion would be put to
such a use, is he liable to this second purchaser for the injury he
sustains ?
Without attempting here to answer categorically these and
countless other similar questions which will at once occur to the
mind, let us see how the rules already laid down by the courts in
this connection would apply to certain of them.
§ i9.-In the first place, as has been seen, it is constantly said
that there is a radical distinction in the liability of the servant or
agent depending upon whether he has or has not entered upon
the performance of his undertaking, and it will be worth while to
examine this distinction more closely to see what it really contains.
it and, while doing so, was injured because of the vicious character of the
horse. Held, that she might recover damages from the proposed seller.
See also post § 26.

HeinOnline -- 20 Yale L.J. 255 1910-1911

YALE LAW JOURNAL
It is said b-: Gray, C. J.,37 in the quotation already given in a
preceding cection, "that if an agent never does anything towards
carrying out his contract with his principal, but wholly omits and
neglects so i.do, the principal is the only person who can maintain any action against him for the non-feasance." Applying this
to the case tf th, steamboat suggested above, if the servant never
starts upon rhe voyage, his refusal to start as he had agreed with
his principai to do, will not render him liable in tort to the expectant passengers. Neither could they have any remedy against
him in contract except upon some theory of a contract made for
their benefit and enforceable by them.
§ 2.-Chief Tustice Gray, however, continues by saying: "But
if the agent once actually undertakes and enters upon the execution of a particular work, it is his duty to use reasonable care in
the manner of executing it, so as not to cause any injury to third
persons which may be the natural consequence of his acts; and he
cannot by ,.bandoning its execution midway and leaving things
in a dangerous condition, exempt himself from liability to any
person who suffers injury by reason of his having so left them
without pioper safeguards." Here are two ideas: (I) Negligence in the performance of his undertaking; and (2) negligently
abandoning performance and leaving things in a dangerous condition. Appl:'ing these rules to the case of the boat, if the servant
starts upor ins iourney but negligently injures his passengers
or third persons l,v his management of the boat while on the way,
he would b,- per ,nally liable. There is nothing new in this. It
is the now famliar rule already referred to which makes the
servant or agent liable for direct and immediate injuries caused
by his negligence while in the performance of his undertaking.
He is also said to be liable for injuries caused "by abandoning
his execution midway and leaving things in a dangerous condition." If, then. in the case of the boat, the servant negligently
(a fortiori if he does it wilfully) abandons the boat or abandons
midstream and thereby causes injury to the
its management -:i
passengers, he would be liable to them.
§ 21.-But suppose the servant or agent in the case of the boat
does neither of dhese things, but, as in one of the cases supposed,
after taking the boat and the passengers in safety half-way across
the stream, he then, against their protests, turns the boat about
and puts them down in safety again at the place from which they
37 In Osborne v.Morgan, 130

Mass.,

102.
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started. Is he now liable to them? Unless the liability of the ser-

vant in these cases is to be confined to acts of physical injury to

person or property, would he not be liable for so negligently
managing the boat that instead of making his proper destination

he makes some other; or even comes around again to the point

from whence he started? Or, if he does it wilfully, would he not
be liable to passengers rightfully on the boat and rightfully headed
toward their destination, if against their will he wilfully turns
them about and carries them in the opposite direction? Has he

any more right to bring them back to the place from which they
started than to take them to some other destination than that
originally agreed upon?
§ 22.

AGENT

LIABLE

FOR

CONDITION

OF

PREMISES

OVER

WHIch HE HAS CONTROL.-On analogy to cases already considered, the agent should be held responsible for injuries caused by
the condition of premises in the possession or under the control of
the agent where the condition is one for which he is responsible
and the injury is such as lie would be liable for if he were controlling the premises on his own account. Thus, if an agent,
having control of premises, should permit or maintain a nuisance
thereon for which he would be liable if he were the principal in
the transaction, lie should be equally liable notwithstanding the
fact that he is but an agent.
For similar reasons, the agent should be held responsible for
injuries caused by his neglect to keep in repair premises under his
control where he is charged by his principal with the duty to repair and has the necessary means, in any case in which he would
be liable for the same injury if- he were controlling the premises
on his own account. In these cases in which the agent has both
the duty (to his principal) and the power to repair, and fails to
do so, the injury can fairly be regarded as the consequence of his
own act.38 If an agent would be responsible for negligently drivas Cases Holding Agent Not Liable.-The case most frequently cited
and perhaps most thoroughly considered in which the agent was held not
liable is Delaney v. Rochereau, .4 La. Ann., 1123, 44 Am. Rep., 456.
This was an action to charge defendants with liability for an injury
resulting from the defective condition of premises, for the owner of which
they were rental agents. The owner of the premises resided in France,
the premises were a two-story building in New Orleans; the defendants
were agents of the owner, "having control as such of the property." Half
of the building was rented and half vacant. A balcony extended along
the front of the entire building and needed repair, as the defendants

knew. But there is nothing in the case to show that they had as to their
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ing his principal's team against a third person, as he would undoubtedly be, is he any the less responsible because he negligently
fails to guide the team or negligently permits it to go unguided
or negligently leaves it unattended and injury thereby results?
If the agent is not in control or has neither the duty nor the power
to repair, the failure to repair cannot be regarded as his act. But
where these conditions are present it is difficult to see why it is
not properly to be regarded as his act. It is, of course, in one
sense a not-doing, a non-feasance; but his act of control is a
doing, a feasance, and his failure to properly control is a misfeasance, if any importance is to be attached to these terms. It
would seem to need no argument to show that the mere not-doing
principal either any duty or any authority to repair or any money with
which to pay for repairs. On two or more occasions defendants had permitted the vacant half to be used for purposes of amusement. On the
night in question, a dance was given in the vacant portion of the building,
without the knowledge or consent of the defendants, by a person who had
obtained the key from a neighbor, and taken possession of the premises.
During the evening twelve or thirteen of the dancers rushed out upon the
balcony, which gave way under them, and they were thrown to the ground.
One of them, a boy about fourteen years of age, was killed by the fall.
His parents brought this action against the agents. It was held that the
agents were not liable. The case was very fully considered with reference to the English, Roman and French law. Some quotations from the
opinion have already been made in the text. The gist of the conclusion is
found in the following extract:
"An agent is not responsible to third persons for any negligence in
the performance of duties devolving upon him purely from his agency,
since he cannot, as agent, be subject to any obligations towards third persons other than those of his principal. Those duties are not imposed upon
him by law. He has agreed with no one, except his principal, to perform
them. In failing to do so, he wrongs no one but his principal, who alone
can hold him responsible."
It is not at all clear that the facts of this case bring it within the rule
of the text. If they do, the answer which it is submitted may be made to
the argument of the court, is that the duty is one not merely imposed
upon the defendants as agents by their contracts with their principals,
but imposed upon them by law as individuals having control of property
not to so control it as to cause injury to third persons.
To same effect as the principal case, is, Carey v. Rochereau, 16 Fed.,
87.
Another case frequently cited is that of Feltus v. Swan. 62 Miss., 415,
wherein the principal and agent were sued together to recover damages for
not keeping open a drain upon land adjoining the plaintiff's, and alleged
in the declaration to have been under the charge and control of
the defendants, one as owner thereof and the other as manager and
agent thereof. Nothing is alleged to show that the agent had any actual
control of the premises or any power or duty in the matter. It was held
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of a particular act which is in itself but a mere incident in the
larger act of doing, ought not to be regarded as such a nonfeasance as will excuse the agent within any proper meaning of
that term.
Not all the cases, it is true, are in harmony with the rules above
laid down, but these rules are believed to be sound, and to be
sustained by the weight of modem authority.
It is, of course, essential to the liability of the agent in these
cases, that he shall be responsible for the condition. If the
premises were in the defective condition when they came under
his charge, and he has neither the power nor the authority to
that the agent was not liable and under the allegations of the declaration
the conclusion would seem to be sound.
In Dean v. Brock, i Ind. App., 507, 38 N. E., 829, the action was
brought against both principals and agents but the principals did not appear and seem not to have beea served with process. It was alleged in the
complaint that the agents were employed to rent the building, collect the
rents, pay the taxes and make the necessary repairs to keep the building
in a tenantable condition. Plaintiff was injured, as he alleged, because
of the rotten condition of certain sills which had not been examined or
repaired for more than twenty years, as the agents knew, as he also alleged, and he charged the agents with negligence in not knowing the
condition and in not making repairs. It was held that the agents were
not liable on the ground that their neglect, if there was any, was mere
non-feasance.
It would be possible to make some distinctions with reference to this
case, but it undoubtedly proceeds upon a theory which cannot be reconciled
with the rule laid down in the text.
The same conclusions were reached in the similar case of Drake v.
Hagan, io8 Tenn., 265, 67 S. W., 470, where the doctrine of Delaney v.
Rocitereau,supra, is approved.
In Kuhnert v. Angell, io N. D., 59, 84 N. W., 579, it was held that the
agent had not such control as to make him liable.
In Laboadie v. Hawley, 61 Tex., 177, 48 Am. Rep., 278, an agent was

held not liable to an adjoining proprietor for an injury sustained by him
by reason of excessive heat and smoke caused by hot fires in a cooking
range which the agent had permitted the tenant to erect in his principal's
building. The case is put upon the ground that in any event it was a mere
non-feasance, but it does not appear that the agent had any real control
over the premises, nor that it was negligent to permit the range to be

erected, nor that there was any negligence in its construction. The injury
arose from the manner in which the tenant used the range.
See Scheller v. Silbermintz, 50 N. Y. Misc., 175.
Cases Holding the Agent Liable.-The following cases hold the agent
liable where he had the control and the power and the duty to make the
repairs:
Baird v. Shipman, 132 Ill., 16, 23 N. E., 384, 22 Am. St., 504, 7 L. R. A.,
128,

where agents for a non-resident owner, with general power to lease
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change them, or if the defect arose while they were in his charge,
but he had no power or authority to correct it, he could ordinarily
not be held responsible. Thus, where an agent who was carrying
on a mill was charged with responsibility for injuries caused by
maintaining the dam at too high a level, but it appeared that the
dam was erected at that height long before he became agent and
and make repairs, were held liable for negligently allowing a stable door
to get into a dangerous condition so that an expressman delivering goods
to the tenant was injured.
Carson V. Quinn, 127 Mo. App.-, 525, 105 S. W., io88, where the agent
with general control over the premises, a flat building, constructed a new
walk in the court and left ahole uncovered.
Ellis v. McNaughton, 76 lich., 237, 42 N. W., 1113, 15 Am. St., 308,
where the agent had general oversight over the erection of a building.
One of the workmen, against the agent's orders, removed a part of the
sidewalk, but the agent, after knowledge of its removal, allowed it to
so remain for some time until the injury.
. Bannigan v. Woodbury, 158 Mich., 2o6, 122 N. W., 531, where plaintiff
was injured while passing along the street, by glass falling from window
of building over which defendant had control to rent.
Lough v. Davis, 3o Wash., 204, 70 Pac., 491, 59 L. R. A., 8o2, 94 Am.
St., 848; same case, 35 Wash., 449, 77 Pao., 732. Here the agent was
authorized to rent, repair and manage. Railing around veranda was allowed to become old and rotten.
In Campbell v. Portland Sugar Co., 62 Me., 552, i6 Am. Rep., 503,
plaintiff was injured by falling through a hole in a wharf. The court
said: "The general agents who had the care of this wharf and who had
agreed with the lessees to make all needful repairs, are certainly in no
hetter position than their principal."
In Stieel v. Borman, 63 Ark., 30, 37 S. W., 404, it was held that
the mere fact that defendant was operating a mine as agent did not make
him liable for injury caused by the collection of gas, unless it appeared that
he had a duty and power to do what was necessary.
In Carter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 84 S. Car., 546, 66 S. E., 997,
it was held that a railroad section boss was liable for allowing weeds to
accumulate on the right-of-way, where they caught fire and burned plaintiff's house.
In Orcutt v. Century Bldg. Co., 2oi Mo., 424, 99 S. W., 1O62, the defendant was a trustee under a deed of trust with power to rent, collect
rent, pay taxes, and all expenses in connection with the maintenance, repair
and management of an office building. An elevator was allowed to become
out of repair.
In Hagerty v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co., 38 Mont., 69, 98 Pac., 643,
the agent, a general manager of the mine, allowed a shaft to become defective.
Applying the same principles: Mayer v. Thonipson-Hutchinson Bldg.
Co., io4 Ala., 611, 16 So., 620, 28 L. R. A., 433, 53 Am. St. Rep., 88;
Greenberg v. Whitconb Lnumb. Co.. go Wis., 225, 63 N. W., 93. 48 Am. St.,
Trepannier,24 Can. S. C., 86.
911. 28 L. R. A., 439; Ferrier -'.
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he bad no power or authority to change it, it was held that he was
not liable.A0
§ 23. SAME SUBJECT-OTHER CASES INVOLVING TIHE SAME
PRINCIPLE.-Many other cases involving the same principle as
that referred to in the preceding section may be determined in the
same way. Thus, an agent having complete charge and control
of building operations owes a duty not only to his principal to
see that the work is properly done, but also to third persons to
see to it that while doing it and with reference to matters over
which he has complete control, he does not negligently injure
them, whether it be by his direct act or by his failure to take the
precautions, without which he ought not to act at all. 40
So the managing agent of a lumber company having full charge
and control of its mill and machinery and of assigning employees
to work at various machines, is personally liable for an injury
caused by setting an inexperienced and ignorant employee at work
upon a dangerous machine. 41
So an agent having complete control and management of a
mine with power and authority to do whatever is reasonably
necessary to prevent injury from its operation is personally responsible for an injury caused by his neglect to take necessary
precautions against the accumulation of dangerous gas therein.4 2
" Brown Paper Co. v. Dean, 123 Mass., 267. Where a master having
an unsafe and insufficient dam across a stream of water ordered his servant to shut the gate and keep it shut until ordered to raise it, and the
servant obeyed the order, by means of which the water was raised so
high that the dam broke away, and an injury was done to a third person,
it was held that the servant was not liable. Hill v. Caverly, 7 N. H., 215,
26 Am.
Dec., 735.
40
Mayer v. Thompson-Hutchison Bldg. Co., io4 Ala., 6xr, 16 South.,
620, 28 L. R. A., 433, 53 Am. St., 88. To same effect, Lottunan v. Barneit,

62 Mo., x59; Harriman v. Stowe, 57 Mo., 93; Lee -. Dodd, 20 Mo.
App., 271.

But see Steinhauserv. Spraul, 127 Mo., 541, 28 S. W., 620, 27 L. R. A.,
44r, in which the doctrine of non-liability for alleged non-feasance is carried to the extreme.See also Ellis v; Southern Ry. Co.,

72

S. C., 465,

52 S.

L. R. A. (N. S.), 378; Fort . IVhipple, ii Hun. (N. Y.), 586.

E., 228,

2

41 Greenberg v. WFhitcomb Lumb. Co., go Wis., 225. 63 N. W., 93. 48
Am. St., 911, 28 L. R. A., 439. Compare O'Neil v. Young, 58 Mo. App.,
628.
42 Stilwell v. Borman, 63 Ark., 30, 37 S. W., 404. To same effect,
see
Hindsbn ,. Markle, 171 Pa. St., 138, 33 Ati., 74.
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So an agent who takes complete charge and control of an office
building, employing, supervising and discharging the necessary
servants, and controlling and directing the operation of the elevators in the building, is personally liable for injury caused by the
by an emcareless supervision and management of the elevator
43
thereof.
charge
in
placed
has
ht
whom
ployee
An agent who has personal charge and control of a building
which he rents for his principal is personally liable to a tenant for
injuries caused to his goods because the agent, after the water
had been shut off from the building for a time, caused it to be
turned on again without seeing that pipes and faucets were in
proper condition.44
The managing directors of a corporation are personally responsible for loss caused to a third person because they negligently
to be accumulated
permitted an undue quantity of high explosives
45
control.
their
under
upon the premises
46
There are, of course, courts, notably those in New York, which
43
Orcutt
44

v. Century Bldg. Co., 2o Mo., 424, 99 S. W., io62.
Bell v. Josselyn, 3 Gray (Mass.), 309, 63 Am. Dec., 741.
43 Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell Com. Co., 22 Mont., 312, 56 Pac., 358,
74 Am. St. Rep., 6o2, 44 L. R. A., 5o8.
To same effect, Nunnelly v. Southern Iron Co., 94 Tenn., 397, 29 S. W.,
361, 28 L. R. A., 421.
The president of an incorporated omnibus line directed its drivers to
exclude colored persons. He was held individually liable for an injury
caused by a driver in obeying such order, and he was not exonerated from
such liability because the corporation might also have been liable. Peck
v. Cooper, 112 Ill., 192, 54 Am. Rep., J31.
But compare Bullock v. Gafligan, ioo Pa., 276.
In Brower v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 3o9 Minn., 385, 124 N. W., io,
an engineer, charged with the duty of keeping a water gauge in repair, negligently put in a gauge and also negligently failed to put the usual guard
around the gauge. Plaintiff was injured by an explosion. Held, The engineer was liable. The negligent putting in of the gauge was misfeasance,
even if the leaving off the guard was mere non-feasance. "The distinction
between misfeasance and non-feasance is sometimes fanciful."
Agent Having no Power to Correct Dcfect.-The doctrine of the foregoing cases, of course, cannot apply where, however great the defect, the
agent sought to be held was without duty, power or means to correct it.
Dudley v. Illinois, etc., Ry. Co., 127 Ky., 221, 96 S. W., 835, 29 Ky. L.
Rep., io29.
46 Thus in Murray v. Usher, 117 N. Y., 542, 23 N. E., 564, it was hel,
that the general manager of a saw mill was not personally liable to ar
employee injured by reason of defective equipment which it was within thpower and the duty of the manager to keep in safe condition.
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would probably regard these cases as cases of non-feasance merely, and therefore as imposing no liability upon the agent directly
to third persons. But the weight of authority is clearly the other
way.
§ 24. SAME SUL'JECT-CAsEs iN WHiIcH AGENT HELD NOT
LIABLE.-On the other hand, there are a number of cases, usually

called cases of non-feasance, and some of which probably were
really such, in which the agent was held not liable. Thus it has
been held, that the agent is not liable to a third person for the
breach of his duty to his principal to give the latter notice of information coming to his attention and which a third person was
interested in having communicated to the principal.4 7
So it is held that the transfer agent of a corporation is not responsible to a third person for refusing to permit him to make a
transfer of stock upon the transfer books of the corporation in
The same principles were applied in Van Antwerp v. Linton, 89 Hun.
(N. Y.), 417, 35 N. Y. Supp., 318,-affirmed by the court of appeals on the
opinion below, in 157 N. Y., 716, 53 N. E., 1133.
. In Potter v. Gilbert, I3o App. Div., 632, 115 N. Y. Supp., 425, where
an
architect owed the contractual duty to the owner to see that the contractor
complied with the plans and plaintiff, a servant of the contractor, was injured by the falling of a wall defectively constructed, the architect was held
not liable, it not being contended that the plans themselves were negligently
drawn.
See also Henshaw v. Noble, 7 Ohio St., 226.
47 In Reid v. Humber, 49 Ga., 207, the court said: "A party shipped his
cotton to his factor; he then told the agent of that factor, who was at another depot from where the cotton was shipped, that he did not wish the
cotton sold until further brders. Was there a legal obligation on thaf
agent towards the shipper to transmit his directions to the factor? From
what did it spring? The agent was bound to his principal, and would have
been responsible to him for any damages recovered against the principal,
on account of the agent's failure. And the shipper may have been entitled
to recover against the principal, either for the neglect of the agent in not
forwarding the instructions, or for the violation of them by the principal,
if they had been communicated. But we cannot see that there was any
such relation between the agent and the shipper as to render the agent liable
to him for the neglect. Had the shipper made the agent his own agent in
the matter for a consideration, the case would be different."
If the agent of the owner of land takes up stock for trespassing on
his principal's property, and if while impounded they are in the possession
and under the control of the principal, and are damaged by the failure of
the principal to give them proper care and attention, the agent is not responsible for the injury thus caused. Kimbrough v. Boswell, ix9 Ga., 20r,
45 S. E., 977.
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the custody of the agent. The remedy, it was said, was by an
4
action against the corporation itself. "
For similar reasons it has been held that the treasurer of a corcapacity to a stockholder for
poration is not liable in his individual
4
refusing to pay him a diiidend. 1
So it is held that a depositor cannot maintain an action against
the cashier of a bank for the misapplication of funds, but the
action must be against the bank itself."
And, generally, it is held that no action at law can be maintained
by stockholders in a corporation against the directors personally
to recover for losses sustained by reason of the misconduct of the
directors. The directors do not owe the proper performance of
their duties as such directly to the stockholders."
§ 25 -So in the case of persons employed in a professional
capacity. The duties which they owe are ordinarily held to be
owing to their immediate employers only, and not to third persons, even though the latter may in some way sustain injury because this duty it not performed. Thus, in a case often referred
to, it was held that an attorney at law was not liable to a third
person who had relied upon an opinion of title negligently errone2
In another the
ous, which the attorney had given to his client?
under the will
donee
a
to
liable
not
held
was
attorney of a testator
secure to the
not
did
it
that
will
the
for so negligently drafting
48

Denny v. Manhattan Co., 2 Denio (N. Y.),

5 id.
15S,

639.

40 French v. Fuller, 23 Pick. (Mass.), io8.

50 Wilson v. Rogers, i Wyo., 51.
,' See Smith v. Hurd, 12 Metc. (Mass.), 371, 46 Am. Dec., 69o; Niles
v. New York, etc., R. Co., 176 N. Y., 119, 68 N. E., 142, and many other
cases to be found in the books on Corporations .
32 National Savings Bk. v. Ward, Ioo U. S., 195.
It is easy, however, to imagine circumstances under which a different
rule would be applicable; as, for example, where the attorney knew or
ought to have known, that the opinion which he rendered was to be relied
upon by such persons as the plaintiff. Thus in this case, it was said by
Waite, C. J., with whom Swayne and Bradley, JJ., concurred, and who
thought that the facts in the case brought it within the rule: "I think
if a lawyer, employed to examine and certify to the recorded title of
real property, gives his client a certificate which he knows or ought to
know is to be used by the client in some business transaction with another
person as evidence of the facts certified to, he is liable to such other person relying on his certificate for any loss resulting from his failure to find
on record a conveyance affecting the title, which by the use of ordinary
professional care and skill he might have found."
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donee the benefits which the testator intended to give him.?' The
same question has also arisen a number of times with reference
to the makers of abstracts of title; and while in general the abstractor has not been held liable to anyone except his immediate
employer, special circumstances have in several cases been held
to be sufficient to extend his liability, as was suggested in the note
respecting the attorney."
"3Bucklcy v. Gray, zio Cal., 339,

42 Pac., 900, 52 Am. St. R., 88.
In Day v. Reynolds, 23 Hun. (30 N. Y. Sup., Ct.), 131, plaintiff, on
being applied to for a loan to be secured by a mortgage, requested the
borrower to procure a search from the county clerk's office. The search
was gotten from defendant, the county clerk, paid for by the borrower,
without knowledge of the purpose for which it was to be used. Held,
the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty in the matter and so is not liable
for failing to note a recorded conveyance by the borrower to a third
person.
In Talpey v. Wright, 6i Ark., 275, 32 S. IV., 1o72, 54 Am. St. Rep.,
2o6, it was held that an indorsee of notes secured by a deed of trust could
not maintain an action against the abstracter for negligently preparing an
abstract for the borrower and lender.
Houseman v. Girard Mutual B. & L. Assn., 81 Pa., 256, to same
effect (semble).
In Schade v. Gehner, 133 Mo., 252, 34 S. W., 576, the plaintiff was the
devisee of her husband whom defendant had undertaken to assist in examining the title to land to be purchased. The court said: "Conceding the
defendant's negligence . . . . That a right of action could not accrue to
anyone else who was not privy to the contract, although damage may have
resulted to such person by reason of the negligence, is the uniform doctrine of the authorities"
In Zweigurdt v. Birdseye, 57 Mo. App., 462, it was held that the
purchaser had no cause of action against the abstracter for negligently
preparing an abstract. for the seller.
In Mallory v. Ferguson, 5o Kan., 685, 32 Pac., 410, the court said:
"We think the great weight of authority is to the effect that the party
making the examination and certificate is liable only to his employer and
never to a stranger or third party."
In Mechanics Bldg. Assn. v. Whitacre, 92 Ind., 547, speaking of the
liability of a register who makes a search and certifies to a title, the court
said, "he would be liable to the party who employed him, but not to such as
might simply see and rely upon such certificate."
In Morano v. Shaw, 23 La. Ann., .379, it was held that the vendee of a
purchaser at sheriff's sale has no right of action against the recorder of
mortgages for having given an imperfect certificate whereby his vendor
was induced to purchase.
The same thing was held in Smith v. Moore, 9 Rob. (La.), 65.
In Brown v. Sims, 22 Ind. App., 317, 53 N. E., 779, 72 Am. St. Rep.,
308, the abstracter was informed that the abstract was to be used to induce
plaintiff to make a loan, and before the loan was made the abstracter

54
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§ 26.-With reference to certain of the cases here under consideration, it may well be that a ground for the agent's or servant's
liability to third persons may be found in the rule which has been
invoked to make liable a manufacturer of goods, dangerous inherently or dangerous through negligent manufacture, to a remote
purchaser and user, even though no contractual relation between
the parties exists. The agent or servant might be liable with his
employer, and no reason is apparent why, in many cases, the agent
or servant who is really at fault should not be held liable, though
no case is now in mind in which this has been attempted.
AGENT NOT LIABLE IN TORT TO TIIIRD PERSONS 'FOP
BREACH OF PRINCIPAL'S CONTRACTS WITH THEm.-An agent is

§ 27.

not usually liable to third persons for the breach of his principal'.s
contracts with such third persons even though the performance othose contracts was confided to the agent by the principal. ThF
agent clearly is not liable on the contract, nor can he ordinarily b-.
liable to the third party in tort for the breach of the .contract.
Whether upon an analogy to the rule which gives an action
against a third person in certain cases for inducing the breach of a
contract, an action in tort might be maintained against an agent
who wilfully disables his principal from performing by withtold plaintiff in person that the -title was clear and that he might rely on
the abstract. The court said, "Where the abstracter has no knowledge
that some person other than his employer will rely in a pecuniary transaction upon the correctness of the abstract, the general rule that his duty
extends only to his employer must be maintained." But held: "We think
it cannot properly be said that the appellee did not owe a duty to the
appellant arising under the contract, the attending circumstances indicating that it was the understanding of all the parties that the service was
"
to be rendered for the use and benefit of the-appellant. ....
In Dickle s,. Abstract Co., 89 Tenn., 431, 14 S. W., 896, 24 Am. St.
Rep., 6x6, it was held that the abstract company was liable to a purchaser
for negligence in furnishing an abstract to the seller. The deed was
drawn up by the abstract company. The court said: "The allegations of
the bill clearly make a privity of contract between the purchasers and the
defendant."
See Siewers v. Commonwealth, 87 Pa., 15.
In Peabody B. & L. Assn. v. Houseman, 89 Pa., 261, 33 Am. St. Rep.,
757. the defendant left certain mortgages off the search on promise by the
borrower that they would be paid and "the defendant's search clerk knew
when he issued the searches that the plaintiffs were about to loan money
on the faith of them." Defendant held liable.
5 See discussion in YALE LAW JOURNAL for November, 195o. 2o YALE
L. JoUR., 69.
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holding his own performance, seems nowhere to have received
much attention.
The moral considerations may often be stronger in the latter
case than in the former. As a "short cut" to te party really at
fault, such an action would have some justification. There is,
however, less need for giving a new action here than in the former case. There, there is no remedy against the party at fault
unless it be one in tort; here, there is always the contractual
remedy of the third person against the principal, and of the latter
against the agent.
§ 28. LIABILITY OF SERVANT OR AGENT TO FELLOW SERVANT
OR AGENT.-Where, under the rules herein laid down, an agent

or servant would be liable to a third person for his negligence, he
will ordinarily be equally liable although the person injured be another agent or servant in the employment of the same principal
or master, and even though, under the so-called fellow-servant
doctrine, the principal or master would not be liable."
Floyd R. Mechem.
The University of Chicago.
56 Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass., 102, 39 Am. Rep., 437 (overruling
Aibro v. Jacquith, 4 Gray (Mass.), 99, 64 Am. Dec., 56); Rogers v. Overton, 87 Ind., 410; Hinds v. Overacker, 66 Ind., 547, 32 Am. Rep., II4; Hinds
v. Harbou, S8 Ind., 121; Hare v. Mchntire, 82 Me., 24o, i9 Atl., 453; 8 L.
R. A., 450; Griffiths v. Wolfram, 22 Minn., 185; Wright v. Roxburgh, 2
Ct. Sess. Cases, 3rd Ser., 748; Brower v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., io9
Minn., 385, r24 N. W., io.
Contra: Southcote v. Stanley (dictum), 25 L. J. Exch., 339.
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